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Turning up the Contrast in a Grey Area:
California Unleashes the Black Letter
Grey Market Goods Act
I. INTRODUCTION
Bargain priced goods naturally attract the financially conscious
consumer.' This is especially true with expensive goods such as elec-
tronic equipment, cameras, watches, and cars. 2 However, the con-
sumer often does not know how the retailer 3 is able to sell these goods
at such low prices.4 The consumer may not realize that the reason for
the low price is because the product was not manufactured for sale in
the United States. Consequently, the product does not come with a
service or quality warranty even though it bears an authentic
trademark.
5
These goods are manufactured in foreign countries and bear a
foreign trademark which is identical to the domestic trademark.
6
This often occurs when a foreign manufacturer creates a United
States subsidiary which registers the trademark in the United States.
7
This subsidiary is generally the foreign manufacturer's authorized
United States distributor.8 However, when the domestic subsidiary
sells the goods at a higher price than the foreign price, other import-
ers have the incentive to buy the goods abroad and sell them in the
United States at discounted prices. 9 Thus, these goods are imported
1. Goodgame, Inside the Gray Market, TIME, Oct. 28, 1985, at 76.
2. CALIFORNIA SENATE RULES COMM., THIRD READING ANALYSIS OF AB 2735 (Aug.
19, 1986).
3. Chains such as K-mart and Montgomery Ward offer many grey market goods for sale
at a discounted price. Goodgame, supra note 1. However, many complaints come from
purchases at "small gift shops and specialty electronics retailers." Gilman, No Guarantees for
Guarantees in Gray Market, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1985, at 33, col. 3.
4. See Diamond, Gray Market Imports Not All Black or White, L.A. Times, Oct. 28,
1985, § IV, at 1, col. 1.
5. Id.
6. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d
903, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1986) (No. 86-625),
argued, 56 U.S.L.W. 3286 (Oct. 6, 1987).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. This becomes most prevalent when the value of the dollar rises with respect to
foreign currency. When the dollar is strong, it has more purchasing power in foreign countries
than domestically. Consequently, items purchased in foreign countries can be sold at reduced
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through channels other than the manufacturer's authorized distribu-
tors.10 Goods such as these are known as "grey market goods.""
This phenomenon of grey market importation has become a
troubling issue for the owners of domestic trademarks 12 and conse-
quently, is the source of much litigation.' 3 The owners of the United
States trademarks claim that the grey market retailers unjustly gain
the benefits of advertising and goodwill paid for by the domestic
trademark holder. 14 Additionally, the domestic trademark holders
claim that grey market goods hurt their reputations since the grey
goods do not come with a manufacturer's express written warranty. 15
For example, when the consumer of a grey market product sends the
item to the United States manufacturer for repairs, the manufacturer
will often send it back unrepaired because the warranty is not valid in
the United States. 6 Thus, the consumer may become angry with the
domestic trademark holder rather than the grey market retailer.
17
The supporters of grey market goods claim that the importation
of such goods encourages competition within the free market.' 8 They
base their argument on the notion that there is no reason for the ex-
treme price differential between European and domestic goods.19 Al-
lowing the sale of these goods at such low prices would force the
manufacturers to lower their prices so that they may be competitive. 20
However, grey market supporters do concede that the lack of warran-
prices in the United States. Feder, 'Gray Market' Grew with the Rise of the Dollar, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 9, 1986, at D4, col. 2 (late ed.).
10. Coalition, 790 F.2d at 904.
11. Id. Grey market goods are also referred to as "parallel imports." Turner, Grey Mar-
ket Litigation in the United States District Courts, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 349, 349
(1986). These goods are genuine goods bearing an authentic trademark. This is to be distin-
guished from counterfeit goods bearing falsified trademarks. See Nolan-Haley, The Competi-
tive Process and Gray Market Goods, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 231, 231 (1984).
12. Comment, Grey Market Imports: A Genuine Problem for the United States Trade-
mark Owner, Customs Service, and Courts, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 762, 763 (1986) (au-
thored by Barbara A. Curry).
13. See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d
903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1986) (No. 86-625),
argued, 56 U.S.L.W. 3286 (Oct. 6, 1987); Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
14. Eason, Marketing in a Gray Area, NATION'S Bus., Apr. 1985, at 62.
15. Goodgame, supra note 1.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Eason, supra note 14, at 63.
19. Goodgame, supra note 1.
20. See Eason, supra note 14, at 63.
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ties add to the price differential. 21 Since the grey goods are without
warranties, the supporters argue that it is up to the consumer to
choose whether they want to buy an item without a warranty in order
to save money.22 The problem with this argument is that the con-
sumer often does not know that the item is a grey market product
without a warranty. 23 In fact, some grey market retailers try to
deceive the consumers by selling grey market goods with a photocopy
of the manufacturer's warranty. 24 Thus, the consumer is unable to
make an informed decision.25 Seeing this as a major problem in the
consumer marketplace, some state legislatures have come to the aid of
the consumer.
26
This Comment will examine how legislatures have approached
the problems presented by importation of grey market goods. Specifi-
cally, the Comment will focus upon the California Grey Market
Goods Act 27 and the extent of its impact upon grey market retailers
located within California, outside of California, and outside of the
United States. In determining the impact upon non-California retail-
ers, the statute is examined under the dormant commerce clause28 and
due process clause29 of the United States Constitution. The Comment
will also examine the application of the Grey Market Goods Act to
the sale of grey market automobiles and watches. Finally, in light of
these analyses, specific amendments to the Grey Market Goods Act
are recommended.
II. THE CALIFORNIA GREY MARKET GOODS ACT
A. Overview
In January of 1987, the California State Assembly expressed its
concern for the unprotected consumer by passing a bill commonly
known as the Grey Market Goods Act (GMGA). 30 The legislative
21. See Kerr, Imports Without a Warranty, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1985, at 52, col. 1.
22. Id.
23. Diamond, supra note 4.
24. CALIFORNIA SENATE RULES COMM., THIRD READING ANALYSIS OF AB 2735 (Aug.
19, 1986).
25. Diamond, supra note 4.
26. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1797.8-.86 (West Supp. 1988); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 218-
aa (McKinney Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-210 (West 1987).
27. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1797.8-.86 (West Supp. 1988).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 186-91 for the definition of the dormant commerce
clause.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST, AB 2735 (1986).
1988]
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purpose was to provide protection for the purchaser of grey market
consumer goods by regulating their sale. 31 Much of the language of
the GMGA was derived from the New York "Warranty Disclo-
sure" 32 Act. 33 Connecticut also has a comparable statute entitled
"Gray Market Merchandise. ' 34
Under the California statute, grey market goods are defined as:
consumer goods bearing a trademark and normally accompanied
by an express written warranty valid in the United States of
America which are imported into the United States through chan-
nels other than the manufacturer's authorized United States dis-
tributor and which are not accompanied by the manufacturer's
express written warranty valid in the United States.35
This definition contains four elements. First, the product must
bear a trademark. 36 Second, similar products sold in the United
States through an authorized distributor would normally be accompa-
nied by a manufacturer's express written warranty. 37 Third, the prod-
uct must be imported into the United States through a distributor that
is not authorized by the manufacturer. 38 Finally, the manufacturer's
warranty for the imported product must not be valid in the United
States. 3
9
The GMGA does not apply to non-consumer goods, goods with-
out a trademark, or goods that do not normally come with a war-
ranty.40 Thus, the GMGA would not apply to the sale of a used
product because used products do not normally come with a war-
ranty. For example, if a consumer purchased a vehicle overseas and
brought it to the United States for personal use, he would not be held
accountable under the GMGA when he sold it.41 However, if this
purchaser imported the vehicle for the purpose of selling it, then he is
31. Id.
32. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 218-aa (McKinney Supp. 1988).
33. CALIFORNIA SENATE RULES COMM., THIRD READING ANALYSIS OF AB 2735 (Aug.
19, 1986); Telephone interview with Jay J. DeFuria, Staff Council, Department of Consumer
Affairs in Sacramento/Principle Consultant, California Assembly Consumer Protection Com-
mittee (Oct. 26, 1987).
34. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-210 (West 1987).






41. The GMGA only applies to retailers of grey market goods. See id. §§ 1797.8-.85.
For a definition of retail seller, see infra note 42.
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not a consumer. This purchaser is actually a retail seller.42 As a retail
seller, he is liable under the GMGA even if he is only selling one
vehicle.
The statute attempts to protect the consumer by requiring the
retail seller of grey market goods to "post a conspicuous sign at the
product's point of display and affix to the product or its package a
conspicuous ticket, label, or tag disclosing any or all of the following"
items:4
3
(1) that the product is not accompanied by a manufacturer's ex-
press written warranty valid in the United States;"
42. Since the term "retail seller" is not defined in the Grey Market Goods Act, it is
helpful to look to other California statutes for the definition. Under the Song-Beverly Con-
sumer Warranty Act, a retail seller is defined as "any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal relationship which engages in the business of selling or leasing con-
sumer goods to retail buyers." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1791(/) (West 1985). Accordingly, a retail
buyer is defined as "any individual who buys consumer goods from a person engaged in the
business of manufacturing, distributing, or selling such goods at retail." Id. § 1791(b). Thus,
to understand the extent of this definition, one needs the definition of consumer goods. They
are defined as "any new product ... that is used, bought, or leased for use primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes, except for clothing and consumables." Id. § 179 1(a).
For a discussion regarding the importation of grey market automobiles, see infra text
accompanying notes 232-65.
43. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1797.81(a) (West Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
44. Id. § 1797.81(a)(1) (implied warranties required by law still exist). New York has a
comparable requirement. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 218-aa(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1988). This
section is currently the subject of litigation in the case of New York v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr
Co., No. 10663/85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Monroe Cty., filed Dec. 10, 1985). In this case, the New
York Attorney General alleged that Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., Inc. (Sibley's) violated the
Warranty Disclosure Act by selling grey market Seiko watches without disclosing to consum-
ers that the watches did not come with a manufacturer's express written warranty valid in the
United States. Verified Petition for the State of New York at 3, 6, New York v. Sibley, Lind-
say and Curr Co., No. 10663/85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Monroe Cty., filed Dec. 10, 1985).
Sibley's responded to the allegations with the affirmative defense (under New York Gen-
eral Business Law section 218-aa(7)) that a comparable warranty was provided by the United
States distributor of the watches, Robert Tabakow Company. Justin Klein's Affidavit for Sib-
ley's at 3, New York v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., No. 10663/85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Monroe
Cty., filed Dec. 10, 1985). See infra text accompanying notes 53-71 for a discussion of Califor-
nia's approach to warranties supplied by grey market retailers. Sibley's argued that the
Tabakow warranty was as protective as a Seiko warranty since they both provide a "one-year
limited warranty against defects in material and workmanship." Justin Klein's Affidavit for
Sibley's at 3, New York v. Sibley, Lindsay & CurT Co., No. 10663/85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Monroe
Cty., filed Dec. 10, 1985).
While the warranties do provide substantially the same coverage, the Attorney General
alleged that the Tabakow warranty was inferior to a Seiko warranty because the consumer of a
Tabakow grey market Seiko watch must pay a service charge of five dollars and mail the watch
to the distributor. Telephone interview with Vincent M. Barone, Assistant Attorney General,
State of New York (Oct. 29, 1987); ROBERT TABAKOW CO., SEIKO WATCH WARRANTY (on
file in the office of the Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L.J.) [herinafter TABAKOW WARRANTY];
HATrORI SEIKO CO., SEIKO WATCH WARRANTY (on file in the office of the Loy. L.A. INT'L
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
(2) that the product is not designed for United States electrical
currents;
45
(3) that the product is not designed for United States broadcast
frequencies;
46
(4) that the manufacturer's United States distributor cannot pro-
vide replacement parts;
47
(5) that the manufacturer's United States distributor cannot pro-
vide compatible accessories;
48
(6) that the instructions are not in English;49
(7) that the purchaser is not entitled to a manufacturer's re-
bate;50 and
(8) that the product is incompatible or does not conform to any
relevant United States standards known to the retailer.
5
1
These same items must be conspicuously disclosed in any advertising
of those products.
52
The required disclosure of the absence of a manufacturer's ex-
press written warranty valid in the United States may be waived if the
retailer meets certain requirements.5 3 First, the retail seller must pro-
vide a substitute express written warranty.5 4 This warranty must pro-
vide the same or better protections and benefits than the
manufacturer's express written warranty which normally would ac-
company the product when manufactured for sale in the United
States. 55 Second, the retailer's express written warranty must comply
& COMP. L.J.) [hereinafter HAirORI WARRANTY]. On the other hand, the Seiko warranty
simply requires the consumer to deliver the watch to a local service facility at no charge. Id.
As a counterargument, Sibley's noted that the Seiko warranty requires the consumer to
pay the postage, shipping and insurance costs necessary to send the watch to a repair facility.
Justin Klein's Affidavit for Sibley's at 4, New York v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., No. 10663/
85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Monroe Cty., filed Dec. 10, 1985); see also HATTORI WARRANTY, supra this
note.
If the court finds that the Tabakow warranty provides at least the same protection as
provided by the Seiko warranty, the charges alleging a violation of the Warranty Disclosure
Act may be dismissed. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 218-aa(7) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
45. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1797.81(a)(2) (West Supp. 1988).
46. Id. § 1797.81(a)(3).
47. Id. § 1797.81(a)(4).
48. Id. § 1797.81(a)(5).
49. Id. § 1797.81(a)(6).
50. Id. § 1797.81(a)(7).
51. Id. § 1797.81(a)(8).
52. Id. § 1797.82.
53. Id. § 1797.81(b).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 1797.81(b)(1). Since section 218-aa(7) of the New York Warranty Disclosure
Act is comparabld to this section of the GMGA, New York v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co.
[Vol. 10:657
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with the requirements of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act
(Song-Beverly). 56 The GMGA specifically requires compliance with
sections 1793.1 and 1793.2 of Song-Beverly. 7 However, the drafters
of the GMGA did not limit compliance to only those sections. 58
Thus, when providing a substitute warranty, section 1797.81(b)(1) of
the GMGA requires the grey market goods seller to comply with all
of the Song-Beverly requirements. 59
The specific Song-Beverly requirements mentioned in the
GMGA concern the warranty disclosure standards of section 1793.1
as well as the standards in section 1793.2 regarding service and repair
facilities. 6° The pertinent part of section 1793.1 requires that any
warranty on consumer products must be in simple language and must
disclose the identity of the warrantor. 6' Section 1793.2, in part, re-
quires that manufacturers providing express warranties must main-
tain sufficient service facilities within California. 62 These facilities
must be "reasonably close to all areas where its consumer goods are
sold to carry out the terms of such warranties .... ,,63 Through the
combination of these statutes, the duties originally imposed on the
manufacturer through Song-Beverly are now being imposed upon the
retail seller of grey market goods.64
In order for the retailer to avoid disclosing the absence of a man-
ufacturer's express written warranty valid in the United States, he
must also inform the consumer that he has copies of the applicable
warranties available for inspection upon request.65 The retailer may
provides a good example of how this type of requirement may be used in litigation. New York
v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., No. 10663/85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Monroe Cty., filed Dec. 10,
1985); see supra note 44 for a discussion of this case.
56. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1797.81(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988). The Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act is the short title for sections 1790-1797.5 of the California Civil Code. CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 1790-1797.5 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988).
57. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1797.81(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988). For a discussion of sections
1793.1 and 1793.2 of Song-Beverly, see infra text accompanying notes 60-64.
58. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1797.81(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988).
59. Id.; DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS/DIVISION OF CONSUMER SERVICES,
CALIFORNIA RETAIL SELLERS MUST NOW DISCLOSE IMPORTANT FACTS ABOUT IMPORTED
CONSUMER PRODUCTS 6 (Jan. 1, 1987). For an in depth analysis of Song-Beverly, see Com-
ment, Consumer Protection: The Effect of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, 4 PAC.
L.J. 183 (1973) (authored by Eileen K. Jenkins).
60. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1797.81(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988).
61. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1793.1(a)(1) (West 1985).
62. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1793.2(a)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
63. Id.
64. See id. §§ 1793.2(a), 1797.81(b)(2). (West Supp. 1988).
65. Id. § 1797.81(b)(3) (West Supp. 1988).
19881
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accomplish this by posting a "conspicuous sign at the product's point
of sale or display, or [the retailer may] . .. affix[ ] ... a conspicuous
ticket, label, or tag" to the product or its package. 66
Additionally, the retailer must comply with the regulations re-
garding pre-sale availability of written warranties promulgated by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).6 7 These regulations were adopted
pursuant to the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act (Magnuson-Moss). 68  Section
2302(b)(1)(A) of Magnuson-Moss provides that the FTC shall pre-
scribe the rules requiring the pre-sale availability of any written war-
ranty on consumer goods. 69 Pursuant to Magnuson-Moss, the FTC
enacted regulations requiring that the seller make the text of any writ-
ten warranties pertaining to consumer products costing more than fif-
teen dollars available to prospective buyers prior to sale. 70 The
retailer must also comply with the Magnuson-Moss and FTC disclo-
sure regulations.
71
The extensive requirements of the GMGA and those incorpo-
rated by reference from Song-Beverly, Magnuson-Moss, and the FTC,
provide strong evidence of the California legislature's intent to ensure
that the consumer is protected and has adequate knowledge upon the
purchase of a grey market product.
B. Remedies and Penalties for a Violation of the GMGA
A violation of the California GMGA can result in numerous
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Id. § 1797.81(b)(4).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(A) (1983).
69. Id.
70. 16 C.F.R. 702.3(b)(1) (1987).
71. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRs/DIVISION OF CONSUMER SERVICES, CALI-
FORNIA RETAIL SELLERS MUST NOW DISCLOSE IMPORTANT FACTS ABOUT IMPORTED CON-
SUMER PRODUCTS 5, 7-9 (Jan. 1, 1987).
The FTC and Magnuson-Moss require warrantors of consumer products to disclose the
following items among others:
(a) whether the warranty is full or limited (see 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a) (1987));
(b) basic rights and duties of warrantors and buyers (id. § 701.3(a)(l)-(5); see also 15
U.S.C. § 2302(a)(l)-(7) (1983)); and
(c) buyer's remedies (16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(6)&(9); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(8)-(9)
(1983)).
Magnuson-Moss also provides the United States Attorney and the FTC the power to
"maintain civil actions to restrain warrantors from making deceptive warranties." DEPART-
MENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS/DIVISION OF CONSUMER SERVICES, CALIFORNIA RETAIL
SELLERS MUST NOW DISCLOSE IMPORTANT FACTS ABOUT IMPORTED CONSUMER PROD-
uCrs II (Jan. 1, 1987); 15 U.S.C. § 23 10(c) (1983).
664 [Vol. 10:657
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penalties. 72 These range from rescission of the sale to large civil
fines.
73
Section 1797.85 of the GMGA provides that a retail seller who
violates the GMGA must give a refund or credit on purchases to a
consumer who returns a grey market product 74 "if the product
purchased has not been used in a manner inconsistent with any
printed instructions provided by the seller."' 75 Furthermore, "[t]here
is no time limit on the buyer's right to return a product for a re-
fund" 76 should the buyer decide to do so.
Section 1797.86 provides that a violation of the GMGA "consti-
tutes unfair competition under Section 17200 of the [California] Busi-
ness and Professions Code, grounds for rescission under Section 1689
of [the California Civil Code], and an unfair method of competition or
deceptive practice under Section 1770 of [the California Civil
Code]." ' 77 All three of these penalties may be imposed for one viola-
tion of the GMGA since they are connected by the word "and," a
conjunctive. 78 Thus, they are not mutually exclusive.
Unfair competition under section 17200 of the California Busi-
ness and Professions Code can result in a maximum civil penalty of
$2500 for each violation.79 The penalty is collected by various gov-
ernmental agencies depending upon which agency prosecuted the
case.8 0 The Business and Professions Code also specifically states that
its remedies and penalties for a violation of section 17200 are cumula-
tive "to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this
state."8 1
Sections 1689 and 1770 of the California Civil Code provide rem-
edies for the injured consumer.8 2 The consumer may rescind under
section 1689,83 and he may bring an action for damages under section
72. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1797.85-.86 (West Supp. 1988).
73. See id.
74. Id. § 1797.85.
75. Id.
76. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS/DIVISION OF CONSUMER SERVICES, CALI-
FORNIA RETAIL SELLERS MUST NOW DISCLOSE IMPORTANT FACTS ABOUT IMPORTED CON-
SUMER PRODUCTS 7 (Jan. 1, 1987).
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1797.86 (West Supp. 1988).
78. Id.
79. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17206(a) (West 1987).
80. Id.
81. Id. § 17205. See infra note 89 for a discussion of cumulative remedies and penalties.
82. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1797.86 (West Supp. 1988).
83. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689 (West 1985).
19881
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1770 for an unfair method of competition or deceptive practice.8 4 The
relief for section 1770 can be found under section 1780.85 Section
1780 allows the consumer to sue for actual damages, an injunction
prohibiting the retailer from continuing such practices, punitive dam-
ages, and any other relief that the court deems proper.
86
Because the warranty provisions of the GMGA also require com-
pliance with Song-Beverly,8 7 a violation of Song-Beverly would result
in a violation of the GMGA.18  Consequently, it is possible that penal-
ties may be imposed for violating Song-Beverly in addition to the pen-
alties imposed for violating other sections of the GMGA. This
conclusion is supported by the fact that the remedies under Song-Bev-
erly are cumulative as specified under section 1790.4 of the California
Civil Code.89 The remedies included under Song-Beverly allow the
consumer to bring an action for the recovery of damages in addition
to other legal and equitable relief specified by the statute. 90 Included
within the damages are those provided by the California Commercial
Code which are predicated upon the actions of the consumer.9' The
consumer may also receive a civil penalty which is not to exceed the
amount of the actual damages by two times.92 Attorney's fees may
84. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1797.86 (West Supp. 1988); see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 1770(u)
(West Supp. 1988).
85. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1780(a)(l)-(4) (West 1985).
86. Id.
87. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1797.81(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988); see supra text accompanying
notes 56-64.
88. Id.
89. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1790.4 (West 1985). Civil actions alleging violations of several
statutes against a defendant for a single bad act often result in multiple (or cumulative) penal-
ties or remedies. The application of more than one penalty or remedy for one wrong act has
been consistently upheld in the courts. The court in People v. Los Angeles Palm Inc. held that
if two statutes are invoked, and one of the statutes provides for cumulative penalties or reme-
dies, penalties or remedies for violating both statutes may be imposed. 121 Cal. App. 3d 25,
33, 175 Cal. Rptr. 257, 262 (1981) (citing People v. McKale, 25 Cal. 3d 626, 633 (1979)). The
United States Supreme Court has also acknowledged the fact that many state statutes allow
"double or treble or even quadruple damages." United States v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550-551
(1942) (citing Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 523 (1885)).
90. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794(a) (West Supp. 1988). For examples of other relief, see infra
note 91.
91. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1794(b) (West Supp. 1988). For example, if the "buyer rightfully
rejected or justifiably revoked acceptance of the goods or has exercised any right to cancel the
sale, sections 2711, 2712, and 2713 of the Commercial Code shall apply." Id. § 1794(b)(1).
"Where the buyer has accepted the goods, sections 2714 and 2715 of the Commercial Code
shall apply, and the measure of damages shall include the costs of repairs necessary .... I d.
§ 1794(b)(2).
92. Id. § 1794(c).
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also be included within the judgment. 93
In addition to Song-Beverly, the grey marketeer must abide by
the requirements of Magnuson-Moss. 94 The Magnuson-Moss Act en-
courages warrantors to establish informal dispute settlement proce-
dures. 95 If the warrantor has established such a procedure in
compliance with the requirements, then the consumer must initially
resort to such a procedure before instituting an action under
Magnuson-Moss. 96 In an action for damages, the consumer may re-
cover damages and other legal and equitable relief as deemed appro-
priate by the court. 97 This may include costs and expenses incurred
by bringing the lawsuit. 98 Additionally, the United States Attorney
General or the FTC may obtain an injunction against the violator.99
As evidenced by the foregoing discussion, a violation of the
GMGA can be very costly to the violator. Although it may appear
that the GMGA has created numerous remedies and penalties, the
GMGA has in fact simply applied previously available remedies to a
new category of potential defendants: retailers of grey market
goods. 100
C Comparison with the New York and Connecticut Statutes
In comparison with the New York and Connecticut statutes, the
superiority of the California GMGA is manifested by the inclusion of
the GMGA in the 1988 volume of Suggested State Legislation. o The
decision to include the GMGA was made after having considered the
benefits and drawbacks of the California, Connecticut, and New York
grey market legislation.102
93. Id. § 1794(d).
94. Id. § 1797.81(b)(4).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) (1983).
96. Id. § 2310(a)(3)(C)(i).
97. Id. § 2310(d)(1).
98. Id. § 2310(d)(2).
99. Id. § 2310(c)(1)(B).
100. Telephone interview with Herschel T. Elkins, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Consumer Law Section (Oct. 27, 1987).
101. Telephone interview with an anonymous representative of the Council of State Gov-
ernments, publisher of SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION (Jan. 8, 1988).
The purpose of Suggested State Legislation is to provide actual legislation on specific top-
ics to act as guidance for states during their legislative process. See 45 COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION iv (1986).
102. Letter from Gary Shapiro to Member [Kemp Hannon] of the Comm. on Suggested
State Legislation (July 6, 1987) (discussing California Grey Market Goods Act) (on file in the
office of the Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J.) [hereinafter Shapiro letter].
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Overall, the California statute is considerably stricter than the
New York or Connecticut statutes. 0 3 The "California law recognizes
that grey market goods may be deficient [in many ways] . . . [and]
requires consumer notification if the product is deficient in any
way."' 4 On the other hand, both New York and Connecticut only
require disclosure when:
(1) the product does not have a manufacturer's warranty valid in
the United States;
(2) the product does not come with English instructions; or
(3) the purchaser is not eligible for a manufacturer's rebate. 105
Unlike California, neither New York nor Connecticut protects the
consumer from goods which are not designed for United States elec-
trical currents or broadcast frequencies.10 6 Additionally, neither of
the two states require disclosure if the manufacturer's United States
distributors cannot provide replacement parts or compatible
accessories. 107
Another aspect of the California law evidencing its stricter re-
quirements is that it does not exempt retailers who unknowingly sell
grey market goods.'0 8 In contrast, this exemption can be found in the
Connecticut law since it only imposes sanctions on retailers who
knowingly sell grey market goods.1°9
Common to all three state grey market statutes is the basic defi-
nition of a grey market product. 10 The only noticeable difference is
that the New York and Connecticut definitions require that the prod-
uct be imported to the United States through unauthorized distribu-
tors "for sale to the public in this state.""' The drafters of the
103. See generally CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 1797.8-.86 (West Supp. 1988); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
CODE § 218-aa (McKinney Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-210 (West 1987).
104. Shapiro letter, supra note 102 (emphasis in original).
105. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 218-aa(3)(a)-(c) (McKinney Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 42-210 (b) (1)-(3) (West 1987). For the California requirements, see supra text
accompanying notes 43-52.
106. See generally N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 218-aa (McKinney Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 42-210 (West 1987). California requires disclosure under these circumstances.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1797.81(a)(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1988).
107. See generally N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 218-aa (McKinney Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 42-210 (West 1987). California requires disclosure under these circumstances.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1797.81(a)(4)-(5) (West Supp. 1988).
108. Shapiro letter, supra note 102.
109. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-210(b) (West 1987).
110. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 218-aa(1) (McKinney Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-210(a) (West 1987); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1797.8(a) (West Supp. 1988).
111. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 218-aa(1) (McKinney Supp. 1988) (emphasis added); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-210(a) (West 1987) (emphasis added).
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California statute removed this phrase from the definition. 1 2 Conse-
quently, the literal interpretation of the California definition of a grey
market product only requires that it be imported through channels
other than the manufacturer's authorized distributors; it does not in-
dicate that the location of the retail seller 1' 3 or that the point of sale
must be in California. I4 Therefore, the retail seller under the GMGA
may be a foreign or out-of-state retail seller. Additionally, the fact
that the goods are imported into the United States does not necessar-
ily indicate that the goods are intended for sale in the United
States. I 5 To import simply means that the goods are transported into
the state from another state or country.1 1 6 Thus, the ultimate con-
sumer of the grey market product may also be the importer.
For example, while Mr. Tourist was vacationing in Japan, he de-
cided to purchase a Vivitar camera. Since he is a United States citi-
zen, when he brings his new camera home, he is theoretically
importing his camera. Under the California statute, it would be a
grey market product since it passes the four part test: the camera has
a Vivitar trademark; Vivitar cameras manufactured for sale in the
United States normally come with express written warranties; Mr.
Tourist is not an authorized distributor; and the warranty on his cam-
era would not be valid in the United States since it was not manufac-
tured for the United States. Thus, Mr. Tourist's Vivitar camera is a
grey market product under the California statute. 1 7 In contrast, the
112. This phrase was included in the first version of the GMGA. See CAL. A.B. 2735,
1985-86 Sess. (original version, Jan. 22, 1986). However, the phrase was stricken from the
GMGA when it was amended in the Assembly on April 7, 1986. See CAL. A.B. 2735, 1985-86
Sess. (as amended, Apr. 7, 1986). Extensive research has not led to an answer to why this
phrase was eliminated.
113. This is especially worrisome for mail order companies. Although the retail mail or-
der company is in another state, under some circumstances, it can be regulated under the
GMGA. See infra text accompanying notes 168-72 and 186-214.
114. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1797.8(a) (West Supp. 1988).
115. Since the term "import" is not defined in the Grey Market Goods Act, it is helpful to
look to other California statutes for the definition. Although import is not specifically defined,
the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act and the State Fireworks Law define the term "importer."
See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23017 (West 1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 12513
(West 1975).
Under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, an "importer" includes "any person bringing
alcoholic beverages into this State from without this State ... which are for delivery or use
within this State." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23017(d) (West 1985) (emphasis added).
An "importer" under the State Fireworks Law includes "any person who for any purpose
... [b]rings fireworks into this state or causes fireworks to be brought into this state." CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 12513(a) (West 1975).
116. See supra note 115.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
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New York and Connecticut definitions of a grey market product re-
quire that the product be for sale to the public within their respective
states.118 Therefore, Mr. Tourist's camera would not be a grey mar-
ket product in New York and Connecticut because it was not for sale
to the public within the state.1 19 Hence, such a consumer would not
be protected under the New York or Connecticut laws.
The question then becomes whether California can impose the
requirements of the GMGA upon foreign retail sellers 20 who sell
grey market goods to a California resident. To answer this inquiry,
the ability to exercise jurisdiction over the potential defendants must
be determined. After jurisdiction is established, the constitutionality
of imposing the GMGA upon the defendant is ascertained by analyz-
ing the statute in light of the dormant commerce clause' 2' and possi-
bly the due process clause 22 of the United States Constitution.
D. Personal Jurisdiction of Foreign & Out-of-State Corporations
In order to prosecute a corporation under the California GMGA,
a court must be able to take personal jurisdiction over the corporate
entity. 123 The constitutionality of exercising jurisdiction depends
upon the defendant's contacts with the forum state.' 24 Traditionally,
the defendant must have "purposely established 'minimum contacts'
in the forum state" before a court may exercise jurisdiction. 125 Stated
differently, the defendant must purposely avail himself of the benefits
and protections of the laws of the forum state. 26 The application of
this rule will "vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's
118. See supra text accompanying note 111.
119. See id.
120. For simplicity, this Comment will assume that the retail seller is a corporation.
121. See infra text accompanying notes 186-91 for the definition of the dormant commerce
clause.
122. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Since parts of the dormant commerce clause analysis
incorporate the notion of due process, it is unusual for a court to apply a separate due process
analysis in a dormant commerce clause case. See South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938). However, cases involving state taxes which affect interstate
commerce have been analyzed under the due process clause. See National Geographic Soc'y v.
California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977). Thus, if the GMGA is analogized to a
tax, a court may apply a due process test. Without this analogy, a court will simply use the
dormant commerce clause analysis.
123. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.1 (1985).
124. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
125. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1984) (quoting International
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
126. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1957).
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activity." 127
Once a court determines that the defendant deliberately estab-
lished the requisite minimum contacts within the forum state, the
court must decide if asserting jurisdiction over the defendant would
"offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "128
In evaluating the facts, the court should consider such items as the
hardship on the defendant, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief in
a convenient forum, the forum state's interest in resolving the contro-
versy, and the national judicial system's interest in efficiency.129
When the defendant is a foreign entity, the court should also consider
the "procedural and substantive" interests of the other nations in-
volved. 130 Additionally, the court will consider whether exercising ju-
risdiction creates unreasonable burdens upon defendants when the
plaintiff's or the state's interests are minimal.13 1
In the recent decision of Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court,132 the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of per-
sonal jurisdiction over foreign corporations in positions similar to
those potentially found under the GMGA. In Asahi, the plaintiffs
were injured in a motorcycle accident. Consequently, they brought a
products liability claim against the Taiwan based manufacturer of the
motorcycle tire tube, Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co., Ltd., (Cheng
Shin). 133 The suit was initiated in California. In response to the law-
suit, Cheng Shin filed a claim against Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd.
(Asahi) seeking indemnification. Asahi had manufactured the valve
assembly for the tube in Japan and sold it to Cheng Shin in Taiwan. 134
Once the valve assembly was incorporated into the tube, Cheng Shin
sold the tube in California. 135 Consequently, Asahi did not have any
direct contacts with California.
The Supreme Court "unanimously found that Asahi could not be
127. Id.
128. International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Millikan v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
129. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
130. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1034 (1987).
131. See id. at 1035.
132. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987). For an analysis of Asahi, see Comment, Specific Personal
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporate Defendants, 10 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 361 (1988)
(authored by Diana K. Tani) [hereinafter Specific Personal Jurisdiction].
133. Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 107 S. Ct. at 1029.
134. Id. at 1029-30.
135. Id. at 1030.
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subject to... personal jurisdiction in the California forum."' 136 How-
ever, there were three different rationales for this result. 37 The plu-
rality opinion focused on Asahi's lack of purposeful contacts with
California. The plurality found that placing a "product into the
stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum State."1 38 The plurality also
addressed the issue of fairness involved in haling a foreign corporation
into a domestic forum. The plurality concluded that requiring Asahi
to appear in a California forum would be too severe.
39
In a separate opinion, Justice Brennan agreed that the California
court should not exercise personal jurisdiction over Asahi.' 40 He
based his decision on his belief that an assertion of jurisdiction would
not be fair or reasonable.' 4' However, he made it clear that he felt
Asahi did meet purposeful availment requirements under the "stream
of commerce" theory.1
42
In a third opinion, Justice Stevens expressed his belief that the
plurality's minimum contacts analysis was unnecessary. 43 He felt
that the reasonableness test was sufficient to determine the constitu-
tionality of exercising personal jurisdiction. 144
As a result of the decision in Asahi, it will be difficult to exercise
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that has no direct contacts
with the forum state. Thus, a California consumer such as Mr. Tour-
ist would not be able to bring an action in California against the Japa-
nese retailer of his camera if the retailer has no contacts with
California. However, unlike the situation in Asahi, many potential
foreign defendants have purposeful contacts with the United States.
136. Specific Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 132, at 377-79.
137. See id.
138. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1033 (1987). From this
statement, it can be inferred that if the foreign corporation did have purposeful contacts, a
court could achieve personal jurisdiction over that corporation. This would be vital for mail
order companies. If a foreign mail order company purposely seeks out California customers,
then it could be subjected to potential claims under California law such as the GMGA.
139. Id. at 1034-35. The reasons given were that Asahi was headquartered in Japan and
that it was unfair for Asahi to work out its dispute with Cheng Shin in a foreign forum. Id.
140. Id. at 1035.
141. Id.
142. Id. This theory holds that -[a] defendant who has placed goods in the stream of
commerce benefits economically from the retail sale of the final product in the forum state."
Id. Thus, the forum state should be able to exercise jurisdiction over such a corporation. Id.
at 1035-36.
143. Id. at 1038.
144. Id.
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When a defendant has purposefully sought contacts in the United
States, a court might be able to exercise jurisdiction over this defend-
ant. 145 Since the corporate structure and factual situation will vary in
each case, the ability to exercise jurisdiction will also vary. Two New
York cases serve as excellent examples of the type of jurisdictional
problems that might arise if a plaintiff tried to sue a foreign corpora-
tion under the California GMGA. These are Frummer v. Hilton Ho-
tels International, Inc. 146 and Delagi v. Volkswagen werk AG. 147
In Frummer, a New York tourist fell and injured himself while
taking a shower in the London Hilton. The plaintiff brought a per-
sonal injury action in a New York court against the hotel which is a
London corporation. 148 Jurisdiction was granted on the basis of the
activities of the Hilton Reservation Service located in New York. 149
Although the London Hilton and the Hilton Reservation Service are
separate corporations, they are both wholly owned subsidiaries of
Hilton Hotels International. 150 The court held that there was an
agency relationship between the London Hilton and the Hilton Reser-
vation Service thereby making it acceptable to exercise personal juris-
diction over the London Hilton.151
The case of Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG 15 2 provides another
illustration of how a court may approach personal jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation. In Delagi, the New York plaintiff was injured in
a car accident in Germany. Consequently, he sued the German car
manufacturer in a New York court. 15 3 The defendant manufacturer
owned one hundred percent of the stock in a New Jersey corporation
to which it exported the German automobiles. 154 Neither the Ger-
man manufacturer nor the New Jersey subsidiary "did business" with
New York. The only relationship with New York was through a New
145. See supra note 138.
146. 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1967).
147. 29 N.Y.2d 426, 278 N.E.2d 895, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1972).
148. Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 535, 227 N.E.2d 851, 852, 281
N.Y.S.2d 41, 42 (1967).
149. Id. at 536-38, 227 N.E.2d at 853-54, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 43-45. The court used the
traditional minimum contacts test so as not to "offiend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' " Id. at 536, 227 N.E.2d at 853, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 44 (quoting International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
150. Id. at 538, 227 N.E.2d at 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
151. Id.
152. 29 N.Y.2d 426, 278 N.E.2d 895, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1972).
153. Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 429, 278 N.E.2d 895, 896, 328
N.Y.S.2d 653, 655 (1972).
154. Id. at 430, 278 N.E.2d at 896, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
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York distributor of the New Jersey subsidiary. 55 Although the New
York distributor was not owned by the manufacturer or its subsidi-
ary, the plaintiff argued that the court should exercise jurisdiction
over the manufacturer because it had control over the distributor in
New York.156 The court held that it could not exercise jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation simply because of control over a domestic
entity. The court went on to say that it would exercise jurisdiction
only if there was "at least a parent-subsidiary relationship."'' 5 7
The decisions of Frummer and Delagi demonstrate that a court
may take personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation if it is a sub-
sidiary of a company which also owns a domestic corporation thus
creating an agency relationship.'5 8 This relationship allows the court
to ascribe the activities of the domestic corporation to the foreign cor-
poration. However, a court may not take jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation if it simply owns the stock of a related domestic
corporation. 159
In another scenario, rather than traveling to Japan, Mr. Tourist
may decide to go to Delaware and purchase a camera from a grey
market retailer in Delaware. The ability to exercise jurisdiction over
this retailer will depend upon the retailer's contacts with California.
The Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with a similar situation in
West American Insurance Co. v. Westin, Inc. 160 In Westin, the de-
fendant was a tavern located in Wisconsin only fifteen miles from
Minnesota.' 6' At the time, Wisconsin allowed people eighteen years
or older to purchase beer or malt liquor. Unlike Wisconsin, Minne-
sota required that the purchaser be at least twenty-one years old. 62
As a result of this discrepancy, the eighteen year old plaintiff drove
from Minnesota to the defendant bar where she consumed alcohol.163
Upon the plaintiff's drive home, she collided with an on-coming car.
Consequently, plaintiff's insurance company brought an action for in-
demnity against the defendant tavern in a Minnesota court.' 64 The
155. Id.
156. Id. at 431-32, 278 N.E.2d at 897, 328 N.Y.S.2d 656-57.
157. Id. at 432, 278 N.E.2d at 897, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 155-57.
160. 337 N.W.2d 676 (1983).
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tavern moved for a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.165 Since
the tavern had no other contacts with Minnesota other than the uni-
lateral activity of the plaintiff, the court dismissed the action.' 66 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Wahl noted that the court could have ex-
ercised jurisdiction if the tavern had solicited business in
Minnesota. 167
Under Westin, Mr. Tourist's ability to bring the Delaware re-
tailer into a California court will depend upon the retailer's contacts
with California. If the retailer's only contact with California con-
sisted of Mr. Tourist's camera purchase, then a California court could
not exercise jurisdiction over the retailer. On the other hand, if the
Delaware retailer solicited sales in California, the concurring opinion
indicated the possibility of exercising jurisdiction.
After Mr. Tourist arrived home in California from Delaware, he
received a mail order catalogue from a grey market retailer located in
Texas. If the retailer violated the GMGA, a California court attempt-
ing to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant would turn to the
United States Supreme Court decision in McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co. 168 for guidance.
In McGee, the plaintiff was a beneficiary of a life insurance policy
underwritten by the defendant insurance company. 169 The insured
lived in California and the insurance company was located in Ari-
zona. Aside from the policy with the insured, the insurance company
had no other contacts with California. 170 When the plaintiff benefici-
ary sued the insurance company for compensation, the Court held it
was constitutional to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.' 71 The
Court reasoned that "the contract was delivered in California, the
premiums were mailed from there," and California had a manifest
interest in providing its citizens with a method of redress. 172
Using the approach of McGee, Mr. Tourist would have a strong
argument for bringing the Texas mail order company into a Califor-
nia court. Mr. Tourist would argue that the mail order form, which
he received at his California residence, constituted a contract; that he
165. Id. at 677-78.
166. Id. at 681.
167. Id. (Wahl, J., concurring).
168. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
169. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221-22 (1957).
170. Id. at 222.
171. Id. at 223.
172. Id.
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mailed the check for his purchase from California; and that California
has a manifest interest in protecting its citizens from deceptive sales of
grey market goods. Foreign mail order companies soliciting grey
market goods to California consumers would also be subject to the
McGee analysis in connection with Asahi.
Although the previously described cases involved personal injury
and breach of contract actions, the same analysis could be used to
determine whether personal jurisdiction over a foreign or out-of-state
corporation exists when other causes of action are involved.'73 Conse-
quently, this analysis would apply to a foreign or out-of-state corpora-
tion that is being sued for a violation of the California GMGA.
Therefore, since the issue of personal jurisdiction will be decided dif-
ferently depending upon the foreign or out-of-state party's corporate
structure and the contacts with the forum state, the remainder of this
Comment will be based upon the assumption that personal jurisdic-
tion is not at issue.
E. Is it Constitutional to Prosecute Out-of-State or Foreign
Corporations under the GMGA?
Assuming that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
the foreign or out-of-state grey marketeer retailing grey market goods
to California consumers, a court must then determine whether it is
constitutional for California to impose such regulations. The consti-
tutionality of imposing the GMGA is largely dependent upon where
the title to the product passes. 174 If the consumer is also the importer
under the California definition of a grey market product, 175 then title
to the product necessarily passes outside California borders, i.e.,
wherever the grey market retailer is located. This situation must be
distinguished from the circumstances where the retailer is located
outside of California, but title to the product passes within California
borders-as is the case with many mail order companies. These situa-
tions must be evaluated in light of the dormant commerce clause176
and possibly the due process clause 7 7 of the United States
Constitution.
173. Specific Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 132, at 364 n. 17.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 178-85.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 116-19.
176. For a definition of the dormant commerce clause, see infra text accompanying notes
186-91.
177. U.S. CONST amend. XIV, § 1.
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1. Title of the Product Passes Outside of California
It is generally well accepted that a state cannot regulate a trans-
action occurring outside of its borders. 178 The Supreme Court of the
United States made this clear in Brown-Forman Distillers Co. v. New
York State Liquor Authority.179 In Brown-Forman, the state of New
York enacted a statute requiring "every liquor distiller or producer
that sells liquor to wholesalers in [New York] to sell at a price that is
no higher than the lowest price the distiller charges wholesalers any-
where else in the United States."1 80 The Court held that the statute
violated the dormant commerce clause 81 of the United States Consti-
tution by regulating conduct and transactions occurring outside the
state. 8 2 The Court's rationale was based on the argument that
"[w]hile New York may regulate the sale of liquor within its borders,
and may seek low prices for its residents, it may not 'project its legis-
lation into [other States] .... , ,"183
Under the analysis of Brown-Forman, California would not be
able to extend the GMGA to transactions occurring outside of the
California borders. Consequently, an attempt to regulate the sale of a
grey market product to a California resident would violate the dor-
mant commerce clause if the sale occurred outside of California. For
example, assume Mr. Tourist purchased a defective grey market cam-
era in another state (such as Delaware) or in another country (such as
Japan), and subsequently imported the item into California. As a re-
sult of Brown-Forman, Mr. Tourist could not bring an action under
the GMGA against the out-of-state or foreign retailer.
178. See Brown-Forman Distillers Co. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573
(1986).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 575.
181. For a definition of the dormant commerce clause, see infra text accompanying notes
186-91. Although the Court in Brown-Forman specifically held that the New York statute
violated the commerce clause, the Court arrived at this decision by using a dormant commerce
clause analysis. See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 578-79. The Court's test consisted of "ex-
amin[ing] whether the State's interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate com-
merce clearly exceeds the local benefits." Id. at 579. For an example of the dormant
commerce clause analysis, see infra text accompanying notes 186-214. Thus, this Comment
will refer to the violation in Brown-Forman as a dormant commerce clause violation.
182. Brown-Forman Distillers Co., 476 U.S. at 582-83 (citing United States Brewers Ass'n
v. Healy, 692 F.2d 275, 279 (1982), aff'd, 464 U.S. 909 (1983)).
183. Id. (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935)).
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2. Title of the Product Passes in California but the Grey Market
Retailer is Located in Another State or Country
When the grey market retailer is located in a state other than
California or in a foreign country, there are circumstances where it
may be subjected to the California GMGA. This could occur when a
California consumer such as Mr. Tourist is solicited by a grey market
mail order company located outside California borders. To determine
whether the GMGA may be imposed upon these retailers, a court
must evaluate the impact of the GMGA under the dormant com-
merce clause18 4 and possibly the due process clause of the United
States Constitution. 185
a. dormant commerce clause analysis
The commerce clause of the United States Constitution grants
Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the Several States .... 11186 Although this clause relates to the
powers of Congress, the Supreme Court has "recognized that it also
limits the power of the States to erect barriers against interstate
trade."' 8 7 This implied limitation upon the states is known as the
dormant commerce clause. 8 However, the states are not completely
barred from creating regulations that affect interstate commerce. 189
In fact, foreign and out-of-state corporations may be "subjected to
reasonable regulation under the state police power."190 Thus, the pur-
pose of the dormant commerce clause analysis is to determine if the
state statute is a valid exercise of the state's police power to create
regulations that have a resulting effect upon interstate commerce. 191
The first part of the dormant commerce clause analysis requires a
determination of whether the state's purpose for the law is legiti-
mate.1 92 According to the Supreme Court in Hunt v. Washington Ap-
184. For a definition of the dormant commerce clause, see infra text accompanying notes
186-91.
185. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
187. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980).
188. Comment, Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica: The Sticky Business of Setting Oil
Pipeline Franchise Fees under the Dormant Commerce Clause 21 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 581, 589
(1988) (authored by Kenneth T. Fong) [hereinafter Shell Oil Co.].
189. Lewis, 447 U.S. at 36.
190. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 98 (1983).
191. See Shell Oil Co., supra note 188, at 589-90.
192. Id. at 590-91 n.51 (citing Professor Christopher May, Bradley Chair in Constitutional
Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles).
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pie Advertising Commission,193 states have a substantial interest in
shielding their citizens from deception and confusion in the marketing
and sale of goods. 194 With respect to the GMGA, California's pur-
pose is to protect the consumer of grey market goods from decep-
tion. 195 According to the holding in Hunt, the purpose of the GMGA
would be legitimate.
For the GMGA to survive a dormant commerce clause analysis,
there must also be a rational relationship between the requirements of
the law and the state's purpose. 196 The Supreme Court in Hunt fo-
cused on whether the regulation was actually protecting against the
problems it was designed to eliminate.197 Thus, under the analysis of
Hunt, the GMGA must be protecting the consumer from the
problems typically associated with the sale of grey market goods.
198
Since the requirements of the GMGA involve disclosure of informa-
tion relating to the typical problems with grey market goods, the con-
sumer will have the necessary knowledge to avoid being deceived. By
requiring disclosure and thereby preventing consumer deception with
respect to grey market goods, the consumer is being protected. Thus,
the GMGA should meet the rational relationship part of a dormant
commerce clause analysis.
The dormant commerce clause also requires an analysis of
whether the burdens upon interstate commerce are outweighed by the
benefits to the state. 199 California burdens interstate commerce by re-
quiring out-of-state retailers to comply with the GMGA when these
retailers sell grey market goods in California. If each state in the
union enacted different grey market regulations, the burden on inter-
state commerce would be exorbitant. However, this is currently not
the case because once the retailer complies with the California statute,
the New York and Connecticut statutes will also be satisfied: the
GMGA is simply stricter than the other two statutes-it does not
conflict with them. Additionally, since the California statute will be
193. 432 U.S. 333 (1976).
194. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1976).
195. See text accompanying note 31.
196. Shell Oil Co., supra note 188, at 590-91 n.51 (1988) (citing Professor Christopher
May, Bradley Chair in Constitutional Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles).
197. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1976).
198. Id.
199. Shell Oil Co., supra note 188, at 590-91 n.51 (1988) (citing Professor Christopher
May, Bradley Chair in Constitutional Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles); see also Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1958); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 711, 781-82 (1945).
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in the 1988 version of Suggested State Legislation,200 it is likely that
other states will enact comparable rather than conflicting statutes.
Thus, the burden upon interstate commerce created by the GMGA
will be outweighed by the benefits to California.
201
The GMGA also provides benefits to the state over and above
those existing under current federal law.20 2 While Magnuson-Moss
and the FTC provide some guidelines regarding warranty require-
ments,20 3 these federal regulations do not protect the consumer of
grey market goods from deception to the same extent as provided by
the GMGA: neither Magnuson-Moss nor the FTC focus upon the
specific problems common to the sale of grey market goods. The re-
quirements of the GMGA clearly benefit California's purpose-to en-
hance the consumers' ability to make an informed decision with
respect to the purchase of a grey market product.
In evaluating the state law, the dormant commerce clause re-
quires a determination of whether the "'statute regulates evenhand-
edly to effectuate a legitimate local [purpose] .' -204 In other words,
the statute must not impose a greater burden on foreign or out-of-
state entities than it does on similarly situated local entities. 20 5 Some
courts refer to this requirement in terms of whether the state statute
discriminates against interstate or foreign commerce. 20 6 Since all grey
market goods are imported from outside the United States, there is a
possible argument that the GMGA discriminates against foreign com-
merce. If the GMGA is found to be discriminatory, California must
prove that there are no other less discriminatory means available to
obtain the results of the statute's purpose.20 7 By definition, grey mar-
ket goods do not originate in the United States. Therefore, because no
comparable domestic problem exists, regulations regarding grey mar-
ket goods will be discriminatory. Since there is no other less discrimi-
natory means for California to control the problem presented by grey
market goods, the GMGA would be found valid under this part of the
dormant commerce clause inquiry. 20 8
200. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
201. See Bibb, 359 U.S. at 529-30.
202. See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1981).
203. See supra note 71.
204. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980) (quoting Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
205. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 55 U.S.L.W. 4478, 4483 (1987).
206. Id.
207. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
208. Id.
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Another aspect of discrimination focuses on whether the GMGA
favors California grey market retailers at the expense of out-of-state
or foreign grey market retailers. 209 This requirement of evenhanded-
ness/non-discrimination should not be problematic for the GMGA
because grey market retailers in California are subjected to the same
requirements as grey market retailers located out-of-state or in an-
other country.
When the retailer is a foreign corporation, the state regulation
burdening foreign commerce will be subjected to a more rigorous
analysis. 210 While the basic dormant commerce clause analysis is still
applied, the court must also recognize that there is a special need for
federal uniformity with respect to foreign commerce. 21' However, the
Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that this need
for uniformity is not absolute. 21 2 Thus, states may impose a regula-
tion upon foreign commerce if the regulation does not "impinge[ ] on
the need for foreign uniformity in the area of foreign trade policy.
21 3
Since foreign mail order retailers of grey market goods, deliberately
seek out California consumers, California should be able to regulate
the sale of their goods.214
In summary, as long as title to the product passes within Califor-
nia's borders, the dormant commerce clause will not prevent Califor-
nia from enforcing the GMGA against foreign or out-of-state retailers
of grey market goods. Hence, an out-of-state or foreign mail order
company soliciting Mr. Tourist in California would be subject to the
requirements of the GMGA.
b. the due process test
In addition to the restrictions imposed by the dormant commerce
clause, the due process clause215 may bar a state from imposing signif-
icant burdens on those entities lacking a significant connection to the
state.21 6 Recently, the Supreme Court has applied this analysis in de-
termining the state's ability to impose a burden of taxation upon enti-
209. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982).
210. South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984).
211. Wardair Can., Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 106 S. Ct. 2369, 2373 (1986).
212. Id. at 2375-76.
213. Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 405 (3d Cir. 1987).
214. This situation may be distinguished from that where the goods are simply passing
through the state in foreign or interstate commerce. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 441
U.S. 434 (1979).
215. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
216. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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ties located outside of the state. 21 7
Regulations, like taxes, impose burdens on foreign and out-of-
state corporations. By analogy, due process might restrict Califor-
nia's ability to impose GMGA disclosure requirements on those enti-
ties lacking a sufficient nexus to California. If a court is willing to
draw an analogy between taxes and regulations, the nexus test of Na-
tional Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization218 pro-
vides an additional hurdle to the extensive dormant commerce clause
analysis. In National Geographic, the Society had a mail order opera-
tion with headquarters in the District of Columbia. Although the So-
ciety had two offices in California, California residents would send
their orders to the Washington D.C. headquarters and the goods were
mailed from either the headquarters or the Maryland offices. 219
Under the California Revenue and Tax Code, a use tax was imposed
on the Society for the sales in California.220
The Supreme Court focused on the issue of "whether the Soci-
ety's activities at the offices in California provided [a] sufficient nexus
between the out-of-state seller [(the Society)] and the State-as re-
quired by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Commerce Clause-to support the imposition upon the Society of
a use-tax-collection-liability .... "221 The Court held that the pres-
ence of the California offices was sufficient to meet the nexus test.222
The Court further held that it did not matter that the offices had no
relationship with the mail order sales.223
The Court in National Geographic distinguished National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois,224 a prior Supreme
Court case involving a use tax imposed upon an out-of-state mail or-
der company. 225 In Bellas Hess, a Missouri based mail order com-
pany's only contact with Illinois consisted of the mail order sales,
217. National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 554
(1977).
218. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
219. National Geographic Society, 430 U.S. at 552. The California offices solicited adver-
tising for the National Geographic Magazine. This was not at all related to the D.C. mail
order sales of "maps, atlases, globes, and books." Id.
220. Id. at 553.
221. Id. at 554.
222. Id. at 556.
223. Id. at 560.
224. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
225. National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 559
(1977).
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catalogues, and flyers-all of which were transported through the
mail or common carrier.226 In that case, Illinois could not impose a
use tax on the mail order sales because the mail order company did
not have the requisite nexus with Illinois.227 In order for a state to
impose a use tax on mail order companies, the company must have
"retail outlets, solicitors, or property within [the taxing] State .... "228
Under the rulings of National Geographic and Bellas Hess, a re-
tail grey market mail order company in another state may be required
to comply with the California GMGA only if it meets the requisite
nexus test. Thus, if a court determines that a grey market mail order
retailer located in another state or in a foreign country has a sufficient
nexus with California, the retailer will be held accountable under the
GMGA for mail order sales in California.
3. Conclusions Regarding Application of the Dormant Commerce
Clause and the Due Process Clause to the GMGA
The constitutionality of applying the GMGA to out-of-state and
foreign entities rests in large part upon where the transaction occurs.
If title to the product passes outside the California border, it would
violate the dormant commerce clause of the United States Constitu-
tion to invoke the GMGA. 229 Thus, while the GMGA does not ex-
pressly indicate where the sale must occur, the United States
Constitution requires that the title of the product must pass within
California's borders before the GMGA may be applied. Conse-
quently, if the consumer imported the product, he must prove that the
sale of the product occurred within California borders before he may
invoke the GMGA. This would be nearly impossible since a con-
sumer must normally purchase a product before he may remove it
from the premises of the retail seller. Thus, when the consumer im-
ports the product into California, the consumer has usually already
purchased the product. Therefore, the title of a item imported by a
consumer normally passes outside of the California borders. The re-
sult is that the consumer may not invoke the GMGA.
If title to the product passes within the California border and the
retailer is not located in California, the constitutionality of imposing
the GMGA might be determined under two approaches: (1) the court
226. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 753-55.
227. Id. at 758.
228. Id.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 181-83.
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may use a dormant commerce clause analysis to evaluate whether the
GMGA is a proper use of the California's regulatory power despite
effects upon interstate commerce; 230 and (2) the court also might anal-
ogize the regulations of the GMGA to a tax and use the nexus test of
National Geographic.231 The GMGA appears to be a valid exercise of
police power under the commerce clause and the outcome of the
nexus test is dependent upon the defendant's contacts with California.
III. APPLICATION OF THE GMGA TO GREY
MARKET AUTOMOBILES
The importation of grey market items such as cameras is a fairly
simple process: the grey marketeer generally purchases the product in
a foreign country and imports it into the United States where it is
sold.232 In contrast, the importation of grey market automobiles is
much more complex. Since grey market vehicles are manufactured
for sale in a foreign country, they do not meet United States standards
promulgated by the federal Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA)233 and the federal Department of Transportation (DOT).2 34
Additionally, the California Air Resources Board (ARB) has pro-
vided specific standards to which a grey market car must conform
before it can be registered or sold in California.235 The question that
arises from this situation is whether the GMGA, which intends to
cover all grey market goods, can satisfactorily apply to these modified
grey market cars.
A. Evidence of a Necessity for Regulating Grey Market Cars
In 1984, the German sticker price of a 500 SEL Mercedes-Benz
was $25,000.236 In the United States, the same model had a sticker
price of $51,950.237 Although additional costs for shipping and con-
230. See supra text accompanying notes 186-214.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 215-28.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 6-11.
233. GAO REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGA-
TIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, AUTO SAFETY AND EMISSIONS: No
ASSURANCE THAT IMPORTED GREY MARKET VEHICLES MEET FEDERAL STANDARDS 3, 20,
53-55 (Dec. 1986) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
234. Id. at 3, 39, 43-48.
235. AIR RESOURCES BOARD, CALIFORNIA CERTIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE TEST
PROCEDURES FOR NEW MODIFIER CERTIFIED MOTOR VEHICLES (July 16, 1986) [hereinafter
CALIFORNIA CERTIFICATION].
236. Berss, What Price Mercedes?, FORBES, Aug. 27, 1984, at 134.
237. Id.
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version added up to approximately $8000,238 the foreign Mercedes
was almost $18,000 less expensive than the domestic Mercedes. This
price differential provided auto importers239 considerable incentive to
purchase the vehicles overseas and import them to the United States.
The primary drawback with these vehicles is that most of them
are manufactured for sale in a foreign country. Thus, they are not
manufactured to meet certain United States specifications. 240 Conse-
quently, the importer must modify the vehicles to meet the United
States standards. 241 Such modifications include the installation of
"U.S. bumpers, U.S. headlights, VIN at windshield pillar, side door
reinforcements, U.S. version seatbelts, and non-flammable seats. ' 242
The importer must also modify the emissions system to meet the stan-
dards of the federal EPA243 and California ARB.244
However, numerous grey market cars have not been properly
modified. According to a 1986 report by Mercedes-Benz of North
America, approximately ninety-five percent of the grey market vehi-
cles inspected failed to meet all of the federal safety requirements. 245
The Mercedes-Benz dealers made:
'simple visual inspections' to determine whether a particular re-
quired feature had been installed. For example, the dealers deter-
mined whether the vehicle had:
* European or U.S. standard headlights,
* reinforcement of any European bumpers,
* bolts in the sides of its doors to indicate their reinforcement,
* seat belts having DOT [(Department of Transportation)]
markings and production date, and
* a vehicle identification number visible from outside the
vehicle.24
6
In addition to violating the above safety standards, many grey
238. Id. at 139.
239. Approximately half of the imports are sold by "professional auto converters who
adapt the foreign-equipped cars to U.S. safety and emission standards. The rest are imported
by tourists, military personnel stationed overseas, or business travelers." Id. at 134.
240. GAO REPORT, supra note 233, at 2.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 47.
243. Id. at 2.
244. See CALIFORNIA CERTIFICATION, supra note 235.
245. GAO REPORT, supra note 233, at 45 (citing the Mercedes-Benz of North America
Report (May 14, 1986)).
246. Id. at 46 (quoting the Mercedes-Benz of North America Report (May 14, 1986)).
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market cars do not meet the required emissions standards. 247 In 1984,
the Environmental Protection Agency tested twenty-seven grey mar-
ket cars for compliance with EPA standards. Of the twenty-seven
vehicles tested, only one passed the emissions test requirements. 248 In
fact, some vehicles cannot be modified to meet the emissions stan-
dards without damaging the design.
249
B. California Statutes Regulating Grey Market Automobiles
Persistent non-compliance with federal EPA standards resulting
in numerous high polluting vehicles prompted the California legisla-
ture to enact specific standards for grey market automobiles apart
from the comprehensive GMGA.250  California legislators enacted
different regulations for new and old grey market cars.251 The lenient
standards for used grey market cars were intended to protect consum-
ers who move to California from other states.252
Prior to amendment, the old California law defined a new grey
market car as a vehicle with less than 7500 miles registered on the
odometer. 25 3 Since these vehicles were subject to tougher standards
than used vehicles, many retailers would "roll[ ] the odometer for-
ward to 7500 miles."' 254 By doing so, the retailers avoided having to
247. Id. at 20.
248. Id.
249. Seamonds, If You Buy a Car on the "Gray Market," U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Mar. 18, 1985, at 49.
250. CALIFORNIA SENATE RULES COMM., THIRD READING ANALYSIS OF SB 1118 3
(May 6, 1985); CALIFORNIA SENATE TRANSPORTATION COMM., ANALYSIS OF SB 1118 2
(Sept. 5, 1985).
251. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 43150-56, 43203.5, 44200-44210 (West 1986
& Supp. 1988). The California statutes refer to new grey market cars as "new direct import
vehiclefs]" and "[n]ew [miodifer [c]ertified [m]otor [v]ehicles." Id. § 43203.5; CAL ADM.
CODE tit. 13 § 1964 (1986). For simplicity, these vehicles will be referred to as "new grey
market cars."
Additionally, California Health and Safety Code section 44200 refers to used grey market
cars as "direct import used motor vehicles." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44200 (West
Supp. 1988) For simplicity, these vehicles will be referred to as "used grey market cars."
Used grey market cars do not fall within the scope of the GMGA because used vehicles
do not normally come with a valid manufacturer's express written warranty. Therefore, the
requirements regarding used grey market cars will not be discussed in this Comment. How-
ever, it should be noted that a used grey market car is one which is at least two years old. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44200 (West Supp. 1988).
252. Baumberger, ARB Sues Dealers, Press Release (July 31, 197x) (date unascertainable)
(on file in the office of the LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J.); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 44210 (West 1986) (amended 1985).
253. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43156 (West 1986) (amended 1985).
254. Regulation of New Vehicles Not Manufactured for California Emissions Standards:
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add the equipment necessary to meet the required standards of a new
grey market vehicle.
255
Seeing this statute as problematic, 25 6 the legislature amended the
statute to incorporate a different definition of a new grey market car.
Under the current law, a new grey market car is defined as one which
is less than two years old.257  Specifically, section 43203.5 of the
Health & Safety Code requires the ARB to adopt "a certification pro-
gram for any light duty motor vehicle manufactured outside of the
United States and not intended by the manufacturer for sale in the
United States which is less than two years old and was not certified by
the [ARB] .... "258 The ARB subsequently set forth these regula-
tions in the "California Certification and Compliance Test Procedures
for New Modifier Certified Motor Vehicles." 259
Hearings on SB 1118 before the California Assembly Transportation Comm., at 2 (July 17,
1985).
255. Id.
256. See id. In addition to the problem with the odometers, there are constitutional con-
cerns regarding the old statute. In the case of Hassen Imports, Inc. v. California Air Resources
Board, the plaintiff alleged that the old sections 43150-56 were unconstitutional under the
supremacy clause, commerce clause, and the fourteenth amendment. Plaintiff's Memorandum
of Points and Authorities at 1-17, Hassen Imports, Inc. v. California Air Resources Bd., No.
C529914 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., settled Apr. 11, 1986).
Hassen argued that the statutes were preempted by section 209 of the Federal Clean Air
Act; that they unreasonably burdened and discriminated against interstate commerce; and that
they denied him equal protection. Id. at 4, 11, 16. Although this case was settled before a
judge could decide it on its merits, Hassen was granted a preliminary injunction on the
grounds that the statutes were unconstitutional. Settlement and Release Agreement at 2, Has-
sen Imports, Inc. v. California Air Resources Board, No. C529914 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Ange-
les Cty., settled Apr. 11, 1986). By settling, the ARB avoided setting precedent and thereby
enabled the ARB to continue prosecuting violations which occurred under the old statutes
prior to amendment. Telephone interview with Steven P. Rice, Partner at Kindel & Anderson;
Attorney for Hassen Imports (Feb. 5, 1988).
257. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43203.5 (West 1986); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 43156(b) (West 1986) (amended 1985).
Section 43156 sets out specific ways in which the age of a motor vehicle shall be deter-
mined. They are as follows, in order of preference:
(a) From the first calendar day of the model year as indicated in the vehicle identifi-
cation number.
(b) From the last calendar day of the month the vehicle was delivered by the manu-
facturer as shown on the foreign title document.
(c) From January I of the same calendar year as the model year shown on the for-
eign title document.
(d) From the last calendar day of the month the foreign title document was issued.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43156 (West 1986) (amended 1985).
258. Id. § 43203.5.
259. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 13 § 1964 (1986).
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C. Applying the GMGA to Retailers of Grey Market Automobiles
The problem with applying the GMGA to the retailer of grey
market cars is that the grey market importers are required to modify
the vehicles to conform with the requirements of the DOT, EPA, and
ARB. 260 Once an automobile has been modified by someone other
than the manufacturer, the modified part of the vehicle might be ex-
cluded from warranty coverage. 261 Thus, since a modified vehicle
might not be accompanied by a complete valid manufacturer's express
written warranty, a modified grey market vehicle might not be classi-
fied as a grey market product under the GMGA.2 62 Consequently,
retailers of modified grey market cars might not be held liable under
the GMGA.2 63 Accordingly, a literal reading of the GMGA could
result in the following inconsistency: the retailer of modified grey
market cars might not be required to disclose the absence of a manu-
facturer's express written warranty. Furthermore, these retailers
might not be required to provide their own express written
warranties.
By allowing a modification to vitiate the requirements of the
GMGA, the purpose of the act, to protect the consumer, would be
defeated. Consequently, if a court were faced with the problem of
whether to enforce the GMGA once the product has been modified,
the court should defer to the legislative intent of consumer protection-
ism. 264 The court should then construe the intent and requirements of
the GMGA and ARB in such a manner so that both statutes may
retain their effectiveness. 265 Moreover, a court should consider the
fact that the warranty is still valid-the modification simply excludes
warranty coverage. Thus, these modified grey market cars are within
the bounds of the GMGA, and the retailer of such cars should be
required to comply with the GMGA.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 241-44.
261. MERCEDES-BENZ OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., OWNERS SERVICE AND WARRANTY
POLICY 8 (1988); Telephone interview with Ronald F. Frank, Counsel for Mercedes-Benz of
North America, Inc. in Southern California (Feb. 24, 1988).
262. Under the GMGA, the definition of a grey market good requires that similar prod-
ucts sold in the United States through authorized distributors would normally come with a
manufacturer's express written warranty. See supra text accompanying note 37.
263. However, a consumer may be able to bring an action for fraud or misrepresention
against such a retailer. This subject matter is beyond the scope of this Comment.
264. See Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd., 11 Cal. 3d 801,
813-14, 523 P.2d 617, 624-25, 114 Cal. Rptr. 577, 584-85 (1974).
265. Id.
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IV. APPLYING THE GMGA TO GREY MARKET WATCHES
An even more compelling example regarding modification of
grey market goods involves watches. United States Customs law re-
quires specific markings on all watches imported into the United
States.266 The name of the importer, country of origin, and other in-
formation regarding the watch's workings must be marked on its
movements and on the inside back of its case.267  Watches manufac-
tured for the United States are marked by the manufacturer prior to
completion. 268 However, most of the watches destined for sale in
other countries are not marked. 269 Consequently, the retailer of grey
market watches must open up the backs of the watches so that they
may be marked.270 Since watches are delicate precision instruments,
this process of opening the watch can impair its performance and may
break the water resistant seal.271
Some watch warranties are automatically voided if the back of
the watch is opened. 272 Additionally, once a watch has been tam-
pered with, the manufacturer's warranty is often invalidated.273 As-
suming arguendo that opening the watch to mark the movements and
case qualifies as tampering, the manufacturer's warranty would be in-
validated by this process. 274  Thus, since a modified watch does not
normally come with a valid manufacturer's express written warranty,
a modified grey market watch would not be classified as a grey market
item under the GMGA. 275 If the modified watch does not fall under
the definition of a grey market product under the GMGA, then the
retailer of the modified watch would not be subjected to the require-
ments of the GMGA. This analysis is identical to that used for modi-
fied grey market cars.276 But, modifying a car may only exclude
partial warranty coverage whereas modifying a watch would void the
266. Seiko Time Corp. v. Alexander's, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560, 565 (July 30, 1982),





271. Id.; Plaintiff's Complaint at 12, Seiko Time Corp. v. J.W. Robinson's Co., No.
856808 (C.D. Cal., settled, Nov. 22, 1985).
272. See TABAKOW WARRANTY, supra note 44.
273. See HATTORI WARRANTY, supra note 44.
274. Whether marking the movements and the inside back of the case constitutes tamper-
ing is a factual issue.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 37 and 262.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 260-63.
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entire warranty. As a result, the need to protect consumers from
modified grey market goods becomes even more apparent.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The California GMGA is a valuable piece of consumer protec-
tion legislation. However, as evidenced by the foregoing analyses, the
statute contains some ambiguous language. Accordingly, the ambigu-
ities give rise to questions regarding the extent of the statute's impact.
Specifically, the lack of the phrase "for sale to the public in this
state" allows the consumer to be the importer and the retailer to be a
foreign or out-of-state entity. Since imposing a state statute upon a
foreign or out-of-state entity raises serious constitutional difficulties,
the GMGA should be amended to include a requirement that the sale
of a grey market product take place within California's borders. This
requirement would resolve any questions as to where the sale must
occur in order for a grey market consumer to uphold his rights under
the GMGA.
Another difficulty arises when a grey market retailer modifies the
product prior to sale to a consumer. As discussed, this situation com-
monly occurs with the sale of grey market automobiles because the
retailer must modify the vehicle prior to sale to meet California and
federal smog standards. Since a modified vehicle often does not come
with a complete valid manufacturer's warranty, a modified grey mar-
ket car might not be a grey market product under the GMGA and the
retailer might not be bound by the requirements of the GMGA. This
same result occurs with the sale of grey market watches which must
be modified to conform to United States customs standards. Since
modifying a watch usually voids the entire manufacturer's warranty,
a modified grey market watch no longer fits the definition of a grey
market good and the retailer would not be bound by the GMGA.
This result is contrary to the original intent of the legislature. The
statute should specifically be extended to cover the sale of modified
grey market goods when such modifications are required by law.
These amendments would clarify the scope of the GMGA. Ad-
ditionally, they would preserve the legislators' intent in a situation
where a technicality could result in a large loss for an unsuspecting
consumer of a modified grey market product.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the ambiguities, the California GMGA provides far bet-
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ter protection for consumers of grey market goods than the compara-
ble statutes of Connecticut or New York. Until the value of the dollar
increases, and lower priced foreign goods become more desirable, the
full potential of the GMGA will not be realized. When the economy
completes its cycle2 7 7 and the value of the dollar again increases, let
the retailer of grey market goods beware, for California will unleash
the Grey Market Goods Act.
Ondrea Dae Hidley*
277. See L. VALENTINE & C. DAUTEN, BUSINESS CYCLES & FORECASTING (6th ed.
1983).
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